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1 In Northern Ireland, the debate on the EU Referendum gave rise to specific issues. Some
arguments were similar to those heard in the other nations of the UK. Thus, the Leave
side claimed that Brexit would enable Northern Ireland to control  immigration or to
prosper outside an increasingly unaccountable EU while the Remain side insisted a lot on
the economic benefits of EU membership or of the EU single market – economic factors
were especially important among border communities owing to the trade ties between
Ireland and the UK. Nevertheless, two specific issues related to the political stability of
the province and the Irish border were also raised, particularly as far as the Remainers
were concerned. 
2 On the one hand, it was feared that leaving the EU would threaten the peace process since
it would undermine the devolution settlement which had been signed in April 1998 (Good
Friday/Belfast Agreement). Such statements were repeatedly made by nationalists during
the campaign. The risk Brexit could pose for the stability and peace of Northern Ireland
was also highlighted by former US President Bill Clinton, former Prime Ministers John
Major and Tony Blair,  and former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who had worked together
during the peace process.1 John Major made it quite clear, stressing that Brexit could
destabilize “the complicated and multi-layered constitutional settlement that underpin[ned] the
present stability in Northern Ireland”.2 
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3 On the other hand, the issue of the Irish border raised much uncertainty in the case of
Brexit.  Several politicians, Prime Minister David Cameron among others, insisted that
border checks would be implemented since Northern Ireland, which was the only nation
of  the UK to have a land border with another EU member,  would become a non-EU
country while the Republic of Ireland would remain part of it. This was an unwelcome
prospect for the Northern Irish insofar as it would revive memories of the Troubles and
weaken the peace process. The two issues were intertwined. 
4 Would  Brexit  really  threaten  Northern  Ireland’s  stability?  In  order  to  answer  this
question and assess the role played by EU membership in this debate, this paper will first
focus on the specificities of the political and constitutional context of Northern Ireland.
Even if Northern Ireland shares commonalities with the rest of the UK, this paper will
highlight “the special status” of the province. It will then analyse to what extent the
European issue is divisive amongst the Northern Irish population and the main political
parties, namely the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) as well as Sinn Féin,3 before touching on their
attitudes towards the EU. The concerns linked to the issues of the peace process and the
Irish border during the EU referendum debate will also be examined. Finally, this work
will try to assess whether these fears were justified. 
5 Northern Ireland had no separate and binding vote in the EU referendum although all
nationalist parties (in Scotland, Wales and the province) did try to ensure that no nation
of the UK could be taken out of the EU against its will. In June 2015, Scottish National
Party (SNP) MP Alex Salmond, the former SNP leader, tabled an amendment to the EU
referendum bill in the House of Commons for that purpose. Nevertheless, the amendment
was only approved by the SNP MPs, the three Plaid Cymru MPs, and the two SDLP MPs,
and eventually was rejected 338 to 59.4
 
The general context: a fragile political stability
6 Several reasons related to Northern Ireland’s specific context can explain why fears about
its  political  stability  appeared  in  the  debate  on  the  EU referendum.  First,  Northern
Ireland  is  a  nation  still  very  divided  along  community  lines,  with  unionists  and
nationalists holding on to their own national identity:5 
the nationalist  community looks to the Republic of Ireland as ‘the mother land’
whereas  the  unionist  community  looks  to  Britain  as  their  patron  state.  While
nationalists aspire to a United Ireland, unionists hope to maintain Northern Ireland
as part of the United Kingdom.6 
7 Community tensions in Northern Ireland do not reflect religious tensions even though
the religious identity of the two communities coincides with their national identity: most
unionists are Protestant and most nationalists are Catholic – even if this generalization is
subject to some qualifications.7 These tensions are ethno-national – they refer to two
groups, each having a specific identity based on common descent, language, culture or
religion, and “with allegiances to two different national communities, Britain and Ireland”.8 This
also means that in Northern Ireland, these divisions involve external actors, namely the
British State and the Republic of Ireland, which partly explains why the Republic reacted
strongly to the danger of Brexit in the EU referendum debate.
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8 The second reason is linked to the ethno-national divide. The peace process has led to a “
complicated  and  multi-layered  constitutional  settlement”  which  was  signed after  years  of
negotiations  and  the  involvement  of  numerous  actors,  including  the  main  political
parties  of  Northern  Ireland,  the  British  and  Irish  governments,  as  well  as,  the  US
government. The three strands of the 1998 Belfast Agreement testify to this complexity:
the  relations  between  the  two  communities  in  Northern  Ireland  (Strand  One);  the
cooperation  between Northern Ireland and the  Republic  and  the  creation  of  several
North-South institutions such as the North/South Ministerial Council (Strand Two); and
the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and the UK, with the creation of East-
West  political  bodies  (Strand  Three).  The  key  components  to  the  Belfast  Agreement
include: (1) power-sharing, including a shared Northern Ireland Executive and a shared
Assembly in Stormont aimed at guaranteeing fair representation in political debates for
both  communities;  (2)  the  principle  of  consent  which  affirms  the  legitimacy  of  the
aspiration to a United Ireland while recognizing the current desire of the majority in
Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom; (3) the removal from the Irish
constitution of a territorial claim to Northern Ireland; (4) the reform of the justice and
security systems and a series of equality and human rights measures.9
9 The  Good  Friday  Agreement  thus  succeeded  in  putting  an  end  to  the  Troubles  but
problems  still  persist.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  not  always  been  easy  to  implement
devolution,  as  exemplified  by  several temporary  suspensions  of  Northern  Ireland
institutions between 2000 and 2007.10 Devolution in Northern Ireland is based on the will
of each community to work together, as mentioned by Valérie Peyronel:
In Northern Ireland, devolution requests the stakeholders, as well as the citizens, to
abide by the very condition of showing their capacity to live and work peacefully
together, despite vitally different political aspirations.11
On the other hand, there is still  sporadic violence in Northern Ireland. As made
clear by the British Home Office in May 2016,  after several  attacks in Northern
Ireland  by  dissident  Republicans,  there  is  a  “continuing  threat  from  dissident
republican activity” – particularly as the IRA splinter groups still consider that Sinn
Féin betrayed  the  republican  ideal  by  signing  the  Good  Friday  Agreement.  The
latter still desire to forcibly remove the British from the region.12 In 2015 and 2016,
more than ten deaths related to the conflict were thus reported in Northern Ireland
involving the Real IRA, as well as, loyalist paramilitaries.13 
 
Does EU membership undermine the ethno-national
divide? 
10 Political stability was all the more fragile in the context of the EU referendum debate as
the EU is, and remains, a divisive issue in Northern Ireland. Concerning the Northern
Irish population, they have been more likely to support the EU than British citizens over
the past decades. In 2015, this was exemplified by a poll, which showed higher support for
EU membership (58%) than in Great Britain (45%) – particularly because the province has
benefited significantly from EU funding.14 
11 However,  attitudes  to  the  EU  seem  to  be  based  on  religious/community  affiliation:
unionists tend to criticize the EU while nationalists are more likely to support it.15 This
was confirmed by several polls carried out during the EU referendum campaign, such as
one  published  by  the  Belfast  Telegraph in February  2016:  a  strong  majority  of  the
nationalist community (74%) was against Brexit while the unionist community (63.6%)
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was in favour of leaving the EU.16 The unionists’ opposition to the EU was mostly based on
the refusal to be part of an unaccountable EU super-state, the wish to regain control of
the UK’s borders, and the need to save money (since the UK was a net contributor to the
EU). Yet, the long-term constitutional status preferred by unionists for Northern Ireland
certainly also played a part.  Brexit  was a way for Northern Ireland to distance itself
politically from the Republic and to make it more likely to remain one of the nations of
the UK.17 Nationalists, however, backed remaining in the EU because Northern Ireland
profited from EU membership including the EU single market, as well as, EU funding –
Northern Ireland was a net beneficiary of the EU (viewing the UK’s contribution to the EU
budget  differently  from  unionists).  The  preferred  long-term  constitutional  status  of
nationalists for Northern Ireland also played a part in this attitude. A United Ireland, the
nationalists’ main objective, would be made easier if both parts of Ireland were part of the
EU.
12 The main Northern Irish  political  parties  have  been divided on this  issue,  but  their
attitudes to the EU have not really reflected the “ethnic dual political system”18 described by
Paul  Mitchell.  Indeed,  the  position  of  some  of  these  parties  on  the  EU  issue  has
significantly evolved over time, calling into question this divide: until the early 1990s the
two main unionist parties (the Ulster Unionist Party – UUP – and the Democratic Unionist
Party – DUP) were opposed to the EU – but the UUP has since evolved towards a more
pragmatic attitude on the issue. Likewise, today the two nationalist parties (the SDLP and
Sinn  Féin)  both  support  the  EU,  but  Sinn  Féin  was  anti-European  in  the  1970s.
Furthermore,  all  the  main  Northern  Ireland  parties  have  tried  to  use  European
institutions to make their voices heard: they “have come to view Brussels as an important
arena for realising and defending the interests of residents of Northern Ireland, not to mention
those of the party itself”.19
13 The DUP is the only party which has always been Eurosceptic, considering the EU as the
anti-Christ  and  part  of  a  wider  Roman  Catholic  plot  to  control  the  continent,  as
articulated by Ian Paisley in the 1980s.20 Setting aside these religious interpretations, the
DUP is opposed to European integration insofar as this process is a threat to the national
sovereignty of the UK and to British identity.21 As already mentioned, the UUP has shifted
from opposition to the EU to a more pragmatic attitude in reaction to the evolution of the
peace process and to new unionism during the 1990s. 22 This change, which was mostly
pioneered by  UUP MEP Jim Nicholson,  has gradually  led  the  party  to  recognize  the
possible benefits of the EU for Northern Ireland and to use the EU as a tool to improve
party fortunes. The UUP thus decided to back the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, even though
it kept refusing those EU initiatives and policies that undermined the sovereignty and
integrity of the UK. 
14 Contrary to the DUP, the SDLP has always been pro-European. The SDLP has become
increasingly  enthusiastic  about  the  EU  even  if  it  has  always  accepted  European
integration and seen the EU as a means towards Irish reunification.23 During his career as
an MEP (1979-2004), John Hume tried to promote these ideas seeking “to use Europe – as a
source of  financial  aid,  political support,  ideas and inspiration – to help resolve the Northern
Ireland conflict”.24 He contributed in particular to changing the nature of the British-Irish
quarrel by encouraging EU involvement and improving the relations between unionists
and nationalists.  For his efforts to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict,  he was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998.25 The SDLP influence at the European level was
illustrated by several official documents, such as the 1993 Downing Street Declaration,
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the 1995 Framework Documents or the 1998 Belfast Agreement. 26 Contrary to the SDLP,
Sinn Féin did not always favour the EU: indeed, the party “has moved from a position of
outright opposition to European integration [in the 1970s] to one of ‘critical engagement’”.27 From
the 1980s/1990s on, Sinn Féin gradually adopted a more pragmatic and cautious attitude
to the EU.  Its  electoral  fortunes at  the European level  have encouraged the party to
elaborate a European policy of its own and to see the EU as an arena in which it could
make its voice heard. In the late 1990s, the change was obvious: the party recognized the
benefits it could gain from EU membership, particularly in its fight to unite Ireland, while
still refusing a European super-state that would threaten national sovereignty. 28 Sinn
Féin also acknowledged the EU’s contribution to the peace process and admitted that the
EU could facilitate Irish unity. Their manifesto for the 2014 European elections illustrates
this: “The EU has a role to play in peace building and supporting the implementation of the Good
Friday Agreement […] The EU should continue to play a role in supporting the peace process...”.29
15 Consequently,  the  EU  remains  a  divisive  issue  in  Northern  Ireland.  Nevertheless,  if
attitudes  to  the  EU  seem  to  be  mostly  formed  according  to  religious/community
identification amongst the Northern Irish population, the ethno-national divide and the “
ethnic dual party system” do not characterize the European policy of the main Northern
Irish parties. Today most of the main Northern Irish parties are pro-European – only the
DUP remains opposed to the EU. Because of these divisions, the EU Referendum could
only raise tensions within the Northern Irish population and the political system.30 This
was illustrated by the Brexit campaign regarding two salient issues.
 
The Brexit campaign: fears linked to the constitutional
status and political future of Northern Ireland
16 The peace process and the Irish border featured heavily in the EU referendum campaign.
The divide among the main political  parties  reflected those mentioned earlier:  three
parties decided to campaign for Remain – the SDLP, Sinn Féin and the UUP – whereas the
DUP recommended a vote to leave the EU.31 What arguments did each of these parties put
forth?
17 Regarding the Remain camp, the SDLP and Sinn Féin highlighted political, constitutional,
historical and economic factors to explain the impact Brexit could have on the peace
process. They considered that Brexit would jeopardize the devolution settlement since
Northern Ireland would no longer be part of the EU, contrary to the Republic of Ireland,
and this would undermine the Belfast Agreement and make the work of North-South
political institutions more difficult (Strand Two). The two nationalist parties thus stressed
that Brexit would call into question all the official documents on which the peace process
had been based, as the SDLP leader Colum Eastwood noted: “A Brexit would undermine and
destabilise the fabric of successive Anglo-Irish Agreements”.32 The special relationship between
Northern Ireland and the Republic, within the EU, was also brought to the fore since
Brexit would “undermine all-Ireland co-operation”– a link which was of utmost importance
to nationalists. 33 They even suggested that it could lead to a revival of violence from
republican paramilitaries.  Former SDLP leader Alasdair McDonnell  highlighted such a
prospect if Scotland decided to leave the UK:
A Brexit decision would trigger a 2nd Scottish independence referendum and a likely
breakup of the UK as we know it. Northern Unionism would be stranded between
loyalty  to  the  Crown  and  their  natural  affinity  with  Scotland.  Provo  dissidents
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would take much advantage of the instability.34
This seemed to them all the more likely as Northern Ireland would no longer be
able to benefit from the EU’s Structural and Investment programmes, like Interreg
or PEACE,35 which contributed to ensuring peace and stability in the province and “
to normalise and stabilise relations between Britain and Ireland”.36
18 Regarding the issue of the Irish border, the two nationalist parties stressed psychological,
historical, political and economic reasons. First, a hard border would revive old memories
linked to the 1921 partition of  Ireland and the Troubles.37 Second,  it  would call  into
question the progress made on the issue of the border, the latter having become invisible
since the Belfast Agreement, as referred to by Colum Eastwood: “The re-emergence of a
physical border between north and south with customs checks would unravel the progress we have
made on north/south partnership to a pre-Good Friday level”.38 Because of the Troubles the
prospect of a hard border was totally unacceptable to Sinn Féin and the SDLP. This led
Sinn Féin to claim that in the event of Brexit, it would “immediately demand a border poll as
provided for under the Good Friday Agreement” – so as to reunify the island. 39 The Belfast
Agreement is indeed based on the principle of consent, which affirms the legitimacy of
the aspiration to a United Ireland while recognizing the current wish of the majority in
Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. Yet, it states that the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland can organize such a poll “if at any time it appears likely to him
that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should […] form part of
a united Ireland”.40 Such a poll would indeed have to be held in Northern Ireland and the
Republic to receive the consent of the people North and South. Sinn Féin’s call  for a
border poll was not new, but the party used the threat of Brexit to revive this prospect.41
19 As mentioned previously, the UUP also decided to be part of the Remain camp. In fact, it
focused on the same arguments as the SDLP and Sinn Féin, but in a British context rather
than in an all-Ireland one. Three key reasons were central to the UUP’s stance on the EU
referendum: (1) Northern Ireland benefited from EU funds, Brexit would consequently
threaten the economy; (2) withdrawing from the EU would reinstate a hard border or
border checks, which was associated with the Troubles and thus unwelcome; (3) if the UK
voted for Brexit (with Scotland voting to stay in the EU), a second Scottish independence
referendum would be almost inevitable with serious consequences for Northern Ireland
because of the breakup of the UK.42
20 It had been difficult for the UUP to make a decision on the issue of EU referendum. Thus,
the party only announced its official position in March 2016, following a meeting of the
party executive. The UUP’s decision to oppose Brexit was based on pragmatic reasons,
which reflected the evolution of the party’s stance on the EU since the 1990s: “Few of us
are great fans of Brussels, but this decision is too important to be decided in a knee-jerk emotional
reaction.  We must  use  our  heads,  not  our  hearts”.43 The UUP first  explained its  cautious
attitude by a willingness to examine the results of David Cameron’s negotiations on EU
reform, but it was also a way to ease tensions on this issue within the party. This was
justified by the UUP’s decision to give their members a free vote on Brexit – which was
rather unusual: “The Party respects that individual members may vote for withdrawal on the
23rd of June”.44 
21 Contrary  to  the  other  three  parties,  the  DUP,  which campaigned for  Brexit,  focused
neither on the peace process, nor on the border with the Republic of Ireland. Indeed, its
main argument was that Brexit would enable the UK to control its future for the following
reasons:  the EU was undemocratic  and unaccountable;  the UK as  a  whole  was  a  net
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contributor to the EU; following Brexit, “powers and monies [would] flow back” to Northern
Ireland.45 The peace process and the Irish border issue were only alluded to in the reply to
the Remain camp. The DUP dismissed the idea that Brexit could undermine the peace
process,  stressing  the  main  threat  was  not  leaving  the  EU,  but  the  paramilitary
organizations, which “remain[ed] intent on killing”.46 Likewise, it highlighted that the Irish
border would not be affected by a British withdrawal from the EU, as Arlene Foster made
clear on the Andrew Marr programme: 
The common travel  area  between ourselves  and the  Republic  of  Ireland was  in
existence before we entered the European Union and it will be there when we leave
the European Union if that’s what the people of the United Kingdom decide to do.47 
The DUP leader thus stated that Northern Ireland and the Republic would both
remain part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) if the UK left the EU, and the CTA
would not be impacted by Brexit.
22 More generally, the issues of the border and the peace process gave rise to contradictory
statements during the campaign amongst the main political  parties.  Although British
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers, a pro-Brexit campaigner, claimed
the border would remain unchanged (thanks to the CTA) in the event of a Brexit, Prime
Minister  David Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa  May said  that  border  controls
would be necessary.48 The Leave side also minimized the impact of Brexit on the peace
process, Theresa Villiers stated that the commitment to peace and democracy would not
be weakened since the Belfast Agreement did not depend on EU membership.49
23 So far, we have seen that the three main Northern Irish parties supporting a Remain vote
used  political,  historical  and  economic  reasons  to  justify  their  stance  in  the  EU
referendum debate.  These reasons were obviously linked to the specific fears of each
party about the potential  impact of  Brexit  on the devolution settlement of  Northern
Ireland and the political future of the province. For the UUP, Brexit meant the breakup of
the UK whereas the SDLP and Sinn Féin considered it would make a United Ireland more
difficult – because of the key role played by the EU in Northern Ireland. Yet none of these
fears  were  brought  to  the  fore  by  the  DUP.  Were  the  concerns  of  the  Remain  side
justified? 
 
Assessment of the role played by the EU in Northern
Ireland
The EU and the Peace Process
24 With regards to the peace process, one could first wonder whether Brexit would imperil
the complex devolution settlement described in the first part of this paper. Indeed, EU
membership50 seemed to  be a  key element  of  peacebuilding as  mentioned in several
official documents, like the 1993 Downing Street Declaration: 
[The Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, TD and the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. John
Major MP] also consider that the development of Europe will, of itself, require new
approaches to serve interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to
Ireland and the United Kingdom as partners in the European Union.51 
Likewise,  the Good Friday Agreement referred to the shared EU membership of
Northern Ireland/UK and the Republic of Ireland, stating that the British and Irish
governments  wished  “to  develop  still  further  the  unique  relationship  between  their
peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as
partners  in  the  European  Union”.52 Regarding  the  North/South  Ministerial  Council
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(NSMC)53 – Strand Two – the Agreement added that this institution had to “consider
the European dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies
and  programmes  and  proposals  under  consideration  in  the  EU framework”.54 Both the
Belfast Agreement, as well as, the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, which provides the
legislative  basis  for  the  establishment  and  implementation  of  the  devolved
Stormont  administration,  stipulated  that  the  legislative  scope  of  the  Northern
Ireland Assembly and Executive had to be compatible with EU law. 
25 Would Brexit undermine this settlement? According to reports and views from several
academics,  it  seems that  these official  documents  would not  be rendered completely
obsolete by Brexit, which would change the devolution settlement, but would not prevent
it from operating. 55 Brexit would only mean that the EU provisions would no longer
apply and would no longer have to be taken into account. The relationship that Northern
Ireland and the UK have with the Republic of Ireland would continue and the power-
sharing elements that form the core of the Good Friday Agreement would not be affected.
The same conclusion was drawn as regards the NSMC. Since the need to comply with EU
law made the work of the NSMC easier, the report published by the Northern Ireland
Affairs  Committee  in  May  2016  explained  that  Brexit  might  make  cross-border
collaboration more difficult, but this would depend on:
the  extent  to  which  UK  Governments  used  the  policy  autonomy  that  would
nominally be afforded them outside the EU. If UK policy diverged significantly from
the EU’s in key areas, it could make cross-border collaboration more difficult to
achieve.56 
Political relations in Northern Ireland could be further undermined because of the
power-sharing government, which compels the two biggest parties, currently the
DUP and Sinn Féin, to share the first ministership in a coalition. Considering the
fact that the DUP campaigned for Brexit whereas Sinn Féin backed Remain, this
could  create  problems  even  if  the  DUP’s  and  Sinn  Féin’s  positions  in  the  EU
referendum debate were predictable. 
26 More generally, regarding the EU’s role in the peace process, opinions are mixed. The
report published by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee stated that the importance of
EU membership should not be exaggerated. While EU institutions played a supporting
role  and  helped  find  a  solution to  the  Troubles  through  specific  funding  and  EU
membership of both the UK and Ireland, they did not determine the success and the
continuity of the peace process. These indeed were due primarily to:
the commitment of successive UK and Irish governments and the willingness of
politicians  and  the  communities  they  represent  to  put  aside  past  differences
sufficiently to allow Northern Ireland to be governed peacefully.57
Nevertheless, such a statement seems overly optimistic and has been contradicted
by academics like Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of
Edinburgh,  who  highlighted  that  a  new,  post-Brexit,  constitutional  settlement
could  change  each  communities’  perception  of  the  peace  process  in  Northern
Ireland.  Indeed,  Bell  stressed  that  the  peace  process  had  been  sold  to  each
community in a specific context: 
While the peace process was sold to Nationalists and Republicans as transformation
of the Northern Irish State, the context of devolution and the close binding of the
devolution framework to EU and ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]
law enabled Unionists to accept the project as one of ‘modernisation’ in line with
the changes that were happening in the UK. Human rights and anti-discrimination
law – transformative for Nationalists in ensuring that the new arrangements would
not  replicate  the  discriminatory  devolution  of  the  past  –  could  be  accepted  by
Unionists as a ‘normal’ part of the British (in Europe) context.58
Northern Ireland: Is Brexit a Threat to the Peace Process and the Soft Irish ...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXII-2 | 2017
8
27 Even if it is difficult to make the case that the peace process depends directly on EU
membership, indirect EU influence has been strong since the EU encouraged unionists
and nationalists in Northern Ireland, as well as the UK and Ireland, to work together.
Northern Ireland’s EU membership has been a key psychological and political factor in
this process. First, common EU membership has enabled the UK and Ireland to improve
their relations. The experience of participating as equals in European institutions has
helped build trust, highlight shared interests and discuss Northern Ireland.59 Second, EU
membership  has  diluted  the  concept  of  sovereignty  of  Ireland  and  eased  tensions
between unionists and nationalists, as exemplified by the creation of the North-South and
East-West  institutions  in  1998.  Multi-level  governance  has  contributed  to  this  more
nuanced understanding of sovereignty insofar as it has given Northern Ireland a way to
bypass  the  British  State  by  using  the  European  level  to  be  heard.60 Brexit  could
consequently deprive the British and Irish governments of the EU as a neutral space
where they could collaborate, and it could revive inter-communal tensions.
28 Moreover, EU funding has been of utmost importance for peace-building since Northern
Ireland has benefited from several European Structural and Investment Programmes, and
above all from PEACE and INTERREG, two cross-border collaboration programmes. Since
1995 there have been three PEACE programmes (with a financial contribution of €1.3
billion), a fourth programme (PEACE IV) was launched in January 2016 – with a total value
of  €270  million.  These  PEACE  programmes  are  aimed  at  ensuring  “cohesion  between
communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland; and
economic  and  social  stability”.61 They  have  funded  infrastructure,  business,  political
reconciliation  and  civil  society  projects  and  encouraged  collaboration  between
communities.62 The EU INTERREG programme aims to support “cross-border co-operation
for  a  more  prosperous  and  sustainable region”,  by  addressing  the  economic  and  social
problems resulting from the existence of borders.63 The INTERREG IVA Programme for
2014-2020 is  worth €256 million. Brexit  would obviously endanger Northern Ireland’s
eligibility  for  continued  access  to  EU  funding.  It  would  also  jeopardize  the  special
Northern Ireland Task Force set up within the European Commission in 2007 to “examine
how Northern Ireland could benefit  more from EU policies,  and how it could participate more
actively in the EU policy process in order to generate more prosperity”.64
 
The EU and the Irish border
29 In addition to posing a threat to the peace process,  Brexit  could also be a source of
instability  for  the border  between Northern Ireland and the Republic.  Thanks  to  EU
membership (including the launch of the Single Market in 1992) and the implementation
of the peace process, the border between the two States has become a soft border. There
has been almost no physical manifestation of the border since the 1990s when customs
checks  were  abolished.65 This  soft  border  has  been  the  symbol  of  successful  peace-
building as well as being of practical importance since it ensures free movement between
the two States. This certainly explains why this issue has been considered as crucial by
researchers.  For  example,  the  report  published  by  the  Northern  Ireland  Affairs
Committee insisted that “an arrangement that maintains a soft land border […] but which does
not see restrictions imposed on travel within the UK would need to be a priority”66 in the event of
Brexit.  Indeed,  Brexit  could,  in  theory,  reinstate  a  hard  border  insofar  as  Northern
Ireland would no longer be part of the EU – unlike the Republic of Ireland. The border
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between Northern Ireland and the Republic would become an external border of the EU
and would have to be managed in order to prevent immigration to the UK from EU-
nationals. Border controls would consequently have to be introduced. 
30 Likewise, Brexit could jeopardize the Common Travel Area (CTA), a special travel zone set
up after the partition of Ireland in 1922. The CTA ensures free movement for nationals of
the UK and Ireland and enables the “UK, the Republic of Ireland, the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man [to] collaborate on border policies and practices as part of the CTA”.67 In 1922 the
British government suggested the creation of the CTA to the Irish Free State because they
refused  to  impose  passport  and  immigration  checks  at  the  Irish  border.  These
arrangements seem to work well and there is no desire to change them.68 According to
Bernard Ryan,  Professor  of  Migration Law at  the University of  Leicester,  three main
reasons  explain  why successive  UK  and  Irish  governments  have  backed  these
arrangements. Firstly, the UK authorities consider an immigration border between the
two States as impractical (since it would mean immigration control on journeys between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain). Secondly, the many economic and social connections
between the UK and the Republic justify the need for a relative freedom of movement
between the two States, and finally, the free movement of labour is important for cross-
border workers.69 
31 Nevertheless,  the  EU could put  an end to  these  arrangements  even though the  CTA
predates British and Irish membership of the EU. Opinions are mixed. On the one hand,
the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee insisted the future of the CTA was not assured: 
The European Union’s Brexit Taskforce told us that as the CTA is an agreement
between two EU members and protected by EU Protocol (it is currently included in
an annex to the Lisbon Treaty), it would no longer apply if the UK was outside the
EU.70 
On  the  other  hand,  Professor  Ryan  considered  that  there  was  no  obvious  legal
reason why Ireland could not retain this benefit after the UK left the EU. Indeed, EU
law (Protocol 20 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) allowed
the UK and Ireland to “continue to make arrangements between themselves relating to the
movement  of  persons  between  their  territories  [the  CTA]”71 and  to  maintain  these
arrangements  outside the Schengen Area.72 What seemed clear was that  the UK
would have to negotiate  a  special  status  (at  least  for  Irish nationals)  in  case of
Brexit. Any bilateral agreement between the UK and the Republic over the border
would have to be approved by the remaining EU members, as put forth by Professor
Dagmar  Schiek,  Jean  Monnet  Chair  of  EU  Law  and  Policy  at  Queens  University
Belfast: “Under EU law, any future relation between the Republic of Ireland and the UK




32 The fears about the impact of Brexit on the peace process and the Irish border, which
were raised in particular by nationalists during the EU referendum debate, were justified.
EU membership has played a key part in Northern Irish politics. It has been a significant
political, economic and psychological factor that has enabled unionists and nationalists to
collaborate  and has  been a means  of  maintaining relationships  with the Republic  of
Ireland.
33 Unlike the main Northern Irish parties whose attitudes to the EU do not reflect the “
ethnic dual party system”, the Northern Irish population still seems to be divided along
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community lines,  as confirmed by the Brexit referendum results.  Even if  most of the
population voted to remain in the EU (by a majority of 55.8 % to 44.2 %), there was a
divide  between  unionist  and  nationalist  constituencies.  Most  majority  unionist
constituencies,  seven out  of  ten (among the  eighteen Northern Irish  constituencies),
voted in favour of leaving, whereas all majority nationalist areas returned a Remain vote.
This consequently means that intercommunal tensions may be revived, particularly as
membership of the EU is a sensitive issue.
34 The  continuity  of  the  peace  process  in  Northern  Ireland  will  depend  on  the  Brexit
arrangements,  which must pay heed to the divisions in the province and include all
relevant  actors,  particularly  Northern  Ireland’s  political  parties  and  the  Irish
government.  So  far  Brexit  negotiations  have tried to take Northern Ireland’s  special
status into account, focusing on the two key issues mentioned in this paper. The UK and
Irish governments have confirmed a shared intention to maintain the benefits of the CTA
although the implications of Brexit are not yet clear. They will certainly do their best to
maintain  most  elements  of  today’s  constitutional  settlement.  Otherwise  peace  and
stability in Northern Ireland could be under threat. 
35 Carine Berbéri is Senior Lecturer in British Studies at the University of Tours. Her
research interests and publications are principally in the field of British politics,
with a particular emphasis on the relationship between Britain and Europe. She is
also  working  on  the  impact  of  British  devolution  and  its  links  with  European
integration issues.
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ABSTRACTS
In Northern Ireland, the EU Referendum debate focused on two specific issues related to the
political stability of the province and the Irish border, particularly as far as the Remainers were
concerned. On the one hand, it was feared that leaving the EU would threaten the peace process
since it would undermine the devolution settlement, which had been signed in April 1998 (The
Good Friday Agreement). On the other hand, the issue of the Irish border raised quite a bit of
uncertainty in the case of Brexit. Several politicians, like Prime Minister David Cameron, insisted
that border checks should be implemented since Northern Ireland, which was the only nation of
the UK to have a land border with another EU member, would become a non-EU country while
the Republic of Ireland would remain part of it. 
Would Brexit really threaten Northern Ireland’s stability? In order to answer this question and
assess  the  role  played  by  EU  membership  in  this  debate,  this  paper  will  first  focus  on  the
specificities of the political and constitutional context of Northern Ireland before analysing the
attitude of the population and the traditional policy of the main political parties towards the EU.
The  concerns  raised  by  the  issues  of  the  peace  process  and  the  Irish  border  during  the EU
referendum debate will then be examined. Finally, this article will try to assess whether these
fears were justified.
En Irlande du Nord deux questions bien spécifiques, qui ont été essentiellement soulevées par les
opposants au Brexit, ont été mises en évidence lors du référendum sur l’Union européenne. Ces
questions étaient liées à la stabilité politique de la Province et à la frontière irlandaise. D’une
part, le camp du Remain craignait que le retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’UE ne menace le processus
de paix dans la mesure où le Brexit remettrait en cause l’accord qui avait été signé en avril 1998
(Accord du Vendredi Saint). D’autre part, ce même camp pour le maintien du Royaume-Uni au
sein  de  l’UE  s’inquiétait  beaucoup  de  l’avenir  de  la  frontière  irlandaise.  Plusieurs  hommes
politiques, tel David Cameron, ont ainsi souligné que des contrôles aux frontières devraient être
mis en place en cas de Brexit, puisque l’Irlande du Nord, qui était la seule nation du Royaume-Uni
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à partager une frontière terrestre avec un autre pays membre de l’UE, quitterait l’UE alors que la
République d’Irlande en ferait toujours partie.
Le  Brexit  peut-il  vraiment  menacer  la  stabilité  politique  de  l’Irlande  du  Nord ?  De  façon  à
répondre à cette question et à pouvoir évaluer le rôle joué par l’adhésion à l’UE dans ce débat, cet
article se concentrera tout d’abord sur les spécificités politiques et constitutionnelles de l’Irlande
du Nord avant d’analyser l’attitude de la population et la politique traditionnelle adoptée par les
principaux  partis  à  l’égard  de  l’UE.  Il  examinera  ensuite  les  inquiétudes  soulevées  par  les
questions  liées  au  processus  de  paix  et  à  la  frontière  irlandaise  dans  le  cadre  du  débat
référendaire. Enfin, il essaiera d’évaluer dans quelle mesure ces craintes sont justifiées.
INDEX
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